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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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Time and Place: Embassy Residence in Paris
May 7, 1955
3 - 4 p.m.

Participants:	Chancellor Adenauer	Secretary Dulles
	Dr. Hallstein	Amb. Conant
	Mr. Blankenhorn	Mr. Merchant
	Interpreter	Mr. Bowie

The Secretary opened by saying that when great events occur which have been worked toward for years, we can take a few moments for congratulations, but must then turn to the new problems of the present. The Chancellor responded that the recent events were not only a matter for congratulations for the Germans. The Federal Republic also feels a deep sense of gratitude to the United States and to the Secretary, without whose help they could not have gotten as far as they have. The Secretary recalled his trip to Bonn after EDC was rejected and the doubts about his skipping Paris but his conviction is that the effect had contributed to the successful outcome. The Chancellor confirmed this view and paid tribute to the courage required at the time in view of the heavy pressure.

The Chancellor then said that he wished to review the political situation in Germany. He recognized that he was not as young as some - he was 14 years older than the Secretary, and fully understands the concern of some in Germany and elsewhere about the possible situation in Germany after he is gone. During this month he intends to transfer the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Von Brentano in order to devote more of his own time to supervising the army build-up because he considers it so important to create the new army with the right spirit and the right people. Von Brentano will continue the Chancellor's policy without change. Under the Federal Constitution, the Chancellor can intervene and shape policy as he deems necessary; and the main officials, including Hallstein, will remain, insuring continuity of administration. The Secretary said he wanted to reserve the right despite the change to continue the privilege of talking to the Chancellor also.

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The Chancellor continued that a really firmly based foreign policy needed a good majority in Parliament for its support. Until the SPD splits, it will be blind to the realities - it may even suffer from some Communist influence. He realizes that statements by some of the coalition leaders, such as the FDP Dehler, sometimes cause concern abroad. He wished to report that yesterday he had had a meeting with three leaders from each of the three coalition parties, and obtained their agreement to follow the Chancellor's foreign policy fully in the new phase. In short, he felt that he could assure the Secretary that German foreign policy would remain stable.

The Secretary then asked the Chancellor for his views on the apparent change of Communist tactics in Europe from opposition to the Socialists to efforts to form a common front as they appear to be doing in Italy, France and to some extent in Britain. In the view of the Chancellor, the Soviets at each stage use the tactics they deem most effective. The "Communist" label has now become such a handicap that they are trying to infiltrate and radicalize the trade unions and parties of the Left. He was recently visited by a representative of the United States trade unions who had attended a trade union conference in Brussels, and felt that he was too optimistic in thinking that the unions and Leftist parties would not be taken in for long by this tactic.

The Secretary then turned to the question of German unification, and asked the Chancellor's thinking on how this problem should now be approached. The Chancellor considers that it is time to do something about the problem, and that the Three Western Powers should take the initiative. In his view the USSR is now in a weaker position both by reason of economic strains arising from over-extending their resources and from their failure to pull the Far Eastern countries into their orbit. At the same time it is necessary to have patience and to endure long negotiations, for we must recognize that the East Zone of Germany raises for the USSR questions of its security and its position in the satellites. In Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, there is much opposition to Soviet control which the Soviets would feel would be enhanced by their release of East Germany. The Secretary then asked whether the Chancellor meant that German unity could be obtained only within the framework of some security system offering assurances to the Soviet Union. The Chancellor considers that the Soviets do not fear Europe or Germany but only the United States, and that their whole policy is

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directed to getting the United States out of Europe, as is shown by their emphasis on foreign bases. Looking at things from their point of view and their goal of world domination, the United States is the only real barrier. Hence, it will take time to convince them that they cannot achieve that goal and to induce them to adjust themselves to that fact. That is why the Chancellor feels that European integration is so vital in order to bind the United States closer to Europe and to block the Soviet aim to strengthen themselves, vis-a-vis the United States. He is convinced that the Soviet people are farther away from democratic attitudes today than under the Czars, and that it will take a long time for them to evolve into a democratic pattern. The Soviets will be a threat as long as they are a dictatorship. The Chancellor feels that the Soviets have failed in their efforts to strengthen themselves in Asia. To him the Bandung Conference showed that Asian countries, including Red China, were not willing to subject themselves to Soviet leadership. In their internal position the Soviets had had serious failures, especially in agriculture both in the Soviet Union and in the satellites, which he viewed as creating critical conditions. They had undertaken an enormous task in trying so rapidly to change the pattern of agriculture radically and to create industrial workers from peasants. From the prisoners-of-war the Germans had learned that the industrial situation in many sectors of the Soviet Union was bad. Another factor is the continuing doubt about the top control. In summary, without being overoptimistic, he felt there were signs that the relative Soviet position was weakening: Europe was growing in strength; Asia wanted to keep clear of Soviet control; the United States has stood firm in its European policy. All this gives basis for hope for a good outcome in the long run, but it will take patience, tenacity and consistency.

Turning to the possibility of Four Power talks, the Secretary then asked the Chancellor's views on (1) whether such talks should include German unity as a topic; (2) whether the Federal Republic would want to participate; and (3) whether its position would be affected by participation also of East Germany. The Chancellor said that he hoped that after due preparation, say by late summer, it would be possible to have a conference on German unity which would of course also raise the question of security safeguards. On the second and third questions, he said that since East Germany could not be excluded if West Germany took part, he felt it would be better for neither to participate. If the East German Government did take part, the psychological effect on the people of the East

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Zone would be extremely bad. For this reason, he would prefer that the Federal Republic be a full partner in preparing for the talks and be constantly consulted during any conference, but not be a direct participant.

The Secretary then asked the Chancellor's view on the handling of the Autobahn issue. The Chancellor said that since the East German ordinance applies to all vehicles except those licensed by it, it clearly violates the Agreement of 1949. Hence, the Three Powers should carry the ball. Ambassador Conant then referred to the meetings with the Russians (Pushkin) scheduled in Berlin for the 20th. In any settlement, the Chancellor was most anxious to avoid the impression that the West was always ready to give in. He was ready to agree to higher payments if calculated on a fair basis and if the money was actually applied to the roads. The Secretary agreed that the Three Powers should insist that the tolls violated the 1949 Agreement with the Soviets, which Ambassador Conant pointed out had been done from the beginning. Both agreed, as did the Chancellor, that stronger action might have been taken earlier in pursuance of the protest. The Chancellor remarked that in dealing with the Soviets it was wise to insist on strict adherence to agreements, even on small points.

Coming back to any Four Power negotiations, the Chancellor said he had one point of deep concern which he wished to entrust to the Secretary. In any negotiation, it should be made quite clear that the implementation of the Paris Agreements would not be stopped. In his opinion the present French Government shares this view, but a future one - and changes are frequent - might not take the same attitude. Hence, the United States should find an occasion to make the point clearly in order to remove any such risk. The Chancellor trusts Pinay and has had good talks with him, but in some countries power is divided between the Minister and the Ministry.

The Secretary then asked how promptly the Federal Republic could get started with carrying out the Paris Agreements so that they would become an accomplished fact. The Chancellor said that contrary to the original plans - which might have been better - he now thinks that they will probably start with volunteers, of which they already have had 100,000 without any appeal. In this way, he believes they can perhaps get started in the fall. In response to a question, he said that even this would require legislation regarding their status, but that this was relatively simple and could probably be passed by the end of July.

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The meeting had to be broken off as the result of the arrival of MacMillan for a 4 o'clock appointment with the Secretary.

RRBowie:pdb

*Approved by
James H. K. Stewart (H.K.)*

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